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economies, and issues of organization and incentives in large economic sys- 
tems. 
There is a general consensus that important economic structural changes 
are occurring in the world economy. There are, however, several alternative 
approaches to measuring these changes, to modeling the process, and to devis- 
ing appropriate responses in terms of policy measures and institutional 
redesign. Other interesting questions concern the role of the international 
economic system in transmitting such changes, and the merits of alternative 
modes of economic organization in responding to structural change. All  of 
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For a small country we analyze the effects of opening for trade on (sectoral 
and national) employment, production, profit and labor income, and on the 
country's welfare. We assume the  sectoral capital inputs to be fixed. Moreover, 
the term 'short-run' denotes a time horizon in which wage rates have not yet 
reached their general competitive equilibrium values. We distinguish between 
several forms of wage rigidities (sectoral or general; downward or complete; in 
terms of different commodities and in terms of a constant-utility combination 
of commodities; rigidity of wage levels or sectoral wage differential). We t ry  to 
draw a connection to the theory of temporary equilibrium with quantity ration- 
ing. 
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"... it  could not be claimed that quantity-adjusted temporary equilibria 
will always depict reality better than price-adjusting ones. However, 
the opposite is not universally true, either." (Dixit, 1978, p. 404) 
In this paper the implications for a small country of opening for trade are 
anzlyzed under varying assumptions concerning wage flexibility. As well as the 
traditional case of a unique, perfectly flexible wage rate we consider cases of 
downward or complete, sectoral or general rigidity of the real wage rate in 
terms of any of the commodities. Furthermore, we analyze the case where 
there is a differential between sectoral nominal wages. 
The method of analysis follows that of Haberler (1950), Hagen (1950), and 
Johnson (1965) insofar as i t  starts from a position of no trade and then intro- 
duces free trade. In addition to the welfare effects of trade we study the conse- 
quences for sectoral output levels and thus for the production structure. More- 
over we shall discuss the  effects on sectoral and total employment levels. 
including cases of excess demand in the labor market. 
In order to make clear the significance of labor market distortions, we 
shall use a graphical illustration that  seems particularly apt for our purposes 
but, as far as we know, has not previously been used in the present context. 
Furthermore, we try to make a first step towards using instruments of so-called 
disequilibrium (or neokeynesian, Fixed-price) analysis in the pure theory of 
international trade, e.g.. rationing schemes. quantity rationing in the labor 
market, and the resulting spill-over effects in the commodity markets. 
As in macroeconomic monetary analysis of open economies (which we 
interpret as a less long-run approach than the standard pure trade model), we 
do not consider explicitly the sectoral capital inputs. In contrast to this pro- 
cedure, previous literature on wage problems in the pure theory of interna- 
tional trade has mostly dealt with the two-factor case. An early exception is 
Hagen (1958) who treats the Ricardo-type, fixed-input coefficient case. More 
recently, Neary (1982) views the sectoral capital stocks as fixed in the short 
run; he  then analyzes the effects of a change in the terms of trade for a small 
open economy whose wage rate in terms of one of the two commodities is fixed 
for the whole economy. We shall treat this case in Section 6. 
With the exception of the sectoral differential wage rates case discussed in 
Section 8. the economy initially is not only closed, but is also in a general com- 
petitive equilibrium. This means in particular that there is only one price in 
every market and that there is no quantity rationing at existing prices; for 
detailed presentations of the conditions necessary for a general competitive 
equilibrium see Meyer (1983, pp. 43.47). Negishi (1972, p. 16), and Schumann 
(1980, pp. 191-200). 
In the next section the basic framework is developed. Section 3 analyzes 
the effects of opening for trade when there is a unique wage rate which is per- 
fectly flexible. In Section 4 some general and introductory remarks are made 
concerning our subsequent analysis of wage problems. Cases of downward rigi- 
dity (at the pretrade level) of the real wage rate are analyzed in Section 5. 
Complete rigidity in terms of the export-competing commodity is discussed in 
Section 6, while complete rigidity in terms of the importable commodity is 
treated in Section 7. Each of these sections distinguishes between general and 
sectoral rigidity. where sectoral rigidity in terms of commodity i means rigi- 
dity only in sector i. In Section 8, where we analyze the case of a dilferential 
between sectoral nominal wages, the distortion is assurned to exist already in 
the pre-trade situation. Finally, Section 9 summarizes the main findings. draws 
some conclusions, and indicates lines of further research. 
2. F'RAKEXORK OF THE ANALYSlS 
The framework utilized is that of the most simple trade model. Its supply 
side can be characterized by the  following assumptions: 
there are only two commodities, XI and X2, both of which are, in prin- 
ciple, tradeable. Each of them is produced by one firm which 
represents a t  the same time one of the two domestic production sec- 
tors; 
there is only one factor of production, labor L,  whose sectoral imports 
L1 and L2 may be varied; 
in order to avoid mathematical problems connected with Ricardo's 
fixed-input coefficient model, we assume diminishing marginal 
returns for this factor in each sector. This may be attributed to  the 
fact that  there also exist other factors of production whose sectoral 
inputs are, however, fixed in the short run; we do not take these fac- 
tors into consideration explicitly. (See Dixit and Norman (1980, pp. 
38-39) on the mathematical problems arising in a hcardo-type model 
and on the  interpretation of diminishing returns in a one-factor 
model; on the latter point see also Neary (1978. pp. 489-490); 
labor supply is given exogenously and thus does not react to  price 
changes ( L ~  =Is). This is in accordance with the standard trade 
model. As the present paper should be understood as describing a 
more short-run analysis than that  model (in the sense that the  effects 
of the opening of trade are analyzed when wages have not yet reached 
their new general competitive equilibrium values), the independence 
of the labor supply from the other variables of the model seems to  be 
even more justified than in the traditional model. (See Helmstadter 
(1979, pp. 98-99) on the relevance of t he  time horizon for the price 
elasticity of the labor supply); 
there is perfect intersectoral, but no international mobility of labor; 
all economic units exhibit competitive behavior in product markets. 
As mentioned before, the supply side is completed by alternative assump- 
tions concerning wage flexibility. On the demand side we do not distinguish 
explicitly between different households, but assume that  the behavior of the 
household sector is identical (except for the levels of the quantity variables) to 
that of a representative household. We assume that the indifference curves 
describing its preferences can be interpreted as social indifference curves. As 
is quite common in the analysis of factor market distortions in the pure theory 
of international trade, the demand side is then represented by a set of social 
indifference curves which determine the demand quantities of both commodi- 
ties, given the price ratio and the production quantities; see, e.g.. Batra and 
Pattanaik (1970, p. 639). Given a production point in the two-commodity 
diagram, the  price line through- this point can be viewed as the country's 
overall budget constraint, stating that the sum of expenditures for both com- 
modities just equals the sum of labor and profit income implied by the produc- 
tion point. I t  should be noted that we assume a completely atemporal decision 
situation for both households and firms, i.e.. there is no asset making it possi- 
ble to transfer purchasing power into the future nor do we allow for storage; 
thus we also neglect savings. 
The following figure is intended to illustrate the idea that  budget lines 
below the full employment line reflect rationing of the household in the labor 
market, i.e., the  demand quantities on such lines reflect the spill-over effect 
From the labor market. Therefore they are denoted as 'effective' demand quan- 
tities, in contrast to 'notional' (or 'Walrasian') quantities which only depend on 
prices. This distinction is one of the central features of the disequilibrium 
theory mentioned above and was called the 'dual decision hypothesis' by Clower 
in his pioneering article; see Clower (1963, pp. 24-26). For a lucid analysis of 
household behavior from the point of view of disequilibrium theory see Meyer 
(1983, pp. 84-87, 125-129. 139-145, and 161-176) who treats the one-commodity. 
one-factor case with and without money. 
In Figure 1, point A represents a full-employment production point. Any 
consumption quantities which lie on the budget line passing through point A 
are called 'notional' because they are  not subject to any quantity rationing. 
(Note that in a small open economy, there are no specific quantity constraints 
in the commodity market, for any domestic agent; instead the overall trade 
balance equilibrium condition only defines a range of admissible combinations 
for the whole of commodity supply and demand quantities: see Dixit (1970, p. 
394) and Neary (1900, pp. 406-409). 
FIGURE 1. 
If there is unemployment, the production point lies below the transforma- 
tion curve, say a t  point B. Because of the reduced income, the budget line lies 
below the line through point A; it is characterized by the employment level 
& <is. where the  subscript H indicates that it is the household that  is 
rationed in the labor market. Consumption points on this line are  called 'effec- 
tive' because they reflect the quantity rationing spill-over effect from the labor 
market. 
It should be noted that the position of the budget line depends on labor and 
profit income, both of which depend on the employment level. Assuming that  
the household takes the budget line through the production point B as a basis 
when choosing the optimal consumption quantities implies that it correctly 
perceives the profit income connected with point B. More precisely, we assume 
consistent profit expectations, i.e., profit income expected by the household is 
equal to the actual profits of the firms. Thus the reduction of the employment 
level from ,? to & causes the budget line to shift not only because of the  
reduced labor income, but also because of the induced change of correct-profit 
expectations. 
Restricting the analysis to  equilibria with consistent profit expectations 
allows us to avoid problems concerning the existence of temporary equilibria in 
later sections. Furthermore, deviations of a given temporary equilibrium from 
general equilibrium can be attributed entirely to wage problems. For a 
thorough discussion of the relationship between temporary equilibria and con- 
sistent profit expectations see Meyer (1983, pp. 132-134, 156-160). 
With both the consumption and production points o n  the country's budget 
line, its balance of trade is in equilibrium. With both points identical, the coun- 
try does not engage in international trade. 
As there is no asset in our model, we do not allow for any trade balance 
disequilibrium. 
3. UNIQUE. PERFECTLY FLEXIBLE WAGE RATE: GENERAL COMPFI1TIVE 
EQUTLIBFUUM 
Figure 2 gives a graphical illustration of both the pre-trade and the free- 
trade general equilibria, with the  points for the latter indicated by circles. In 
the figure Parts I1 and TV show the  sectoral production functions, both of which 
exhibit diminishing positive returns of the only variable factor of production, 
labor; labor input in the first (second) sector is denoted as L 1  ( L ~ ) .  Parts I and 
VI show the corresponding marginal productivity schedules, which are drawn as 
straight lines for simplicity only. Part  V represents the equilibrium condition 
for the labor market, with the exogenous labor supply quantity indicated by 
the intercepts on both the L 1  and the L 2  axes. Part VII reflects the fact that  in 
a perfectly competitive economy the value marginal product of labor must  be 
equal in all sectors and therefore the same must be true for the marginal pro- 
ducts in terms of any commodity; assuming profit-maximizing behavior on the  
part of the firms, these marginal products equal the real wage rate in terms of 
the respective commodity ( w / p l ,  w / p 2  ). In part I11 the supply side is sum- 
marized in the production possibility curve. Its tangency point with a social 
indifference curve (point A) gives the pre-trade, general competitive equili- 
brium amounts of both commodities. The corresponding points in the other 
parts of the figure indicate the implied sectoral inputs of labor and its marginal 
productivities. The pre-trade ratio of the commodity prices p l / p 2  is 
represented by the tangent of the angle al in part VII. 
When the economy is opened for trade, the domestic country adopts the 
international price ratio, which is assumed to be smaller than the pre-trade 
ratio; in part VII the new ratio is indicated by the tangent of the angle a2. With 
the wage rate unique and perfectly flexible, we find the usual effects of the  
introduction of free trade (in Kgure 2, the free-trade points a re  connected by 
dashed lines): 
-- from part I1 i t  can be seen that output and employment are raised in 
the second sector, i.e., in the sector whose relative commodity price 
in terms of the other sector's product has increased. On the other 
hand, levels of employment and production are reduced in the first 
sector, as can be seen from part IV; 
-- in part Ill, the new production quantities are summarized in point B. 
Comparing B with the pre-trade production point A shows the change 
of the production structure X2/X1 in favor of the second sector; 
profit income in the second sector in terms of its output 
(Gl/pl  = Xl - w / p  l.L1) is given by the intercept of the tangent to a 
given production point in part 11 (in order not to overload the figure, 
no such tangents are actually drawn). It can be easily seen that the  
intercept of the tangent for the new production point exceeds that for 
the pre-trade point. Moreover, multiplying the increased profit 
income in terms of X2 by the inverse of the ra t iop l /p2  shows that the  
second sector's profit income has gone up even more in terms of XI. 
By similar reasoning it can be seen with the help of part  IV that the  
opposite results hold for the first sector; 
-- in both sectors, the marginal products of labor and thus the real wage 
rates have gone up (down) in terrns of X,(X,), as can be seen from 
parts I, VI. and VII. With the overall employment level constant, the 
same is true for labor income in terms of X1(X2); 
FIGURE 2. 
-- part 111 shows that, in contrast to the direction in which production 
has specialized, demand for XI is raised while that for X2 is reduced. 
This leads the domestic country to export X2 and to import XI. 
-- part 111 shows that opening for trade permits the economy to reach a 
higher welfare level. 
4. "WAGE PROBLEMS' AND EQUILIBRIUM: SOME PRELIMINARY FWbWKS 
In the general competitive equilibrium analysis we implicitly made the  
assumption that the wage rate (and in the  closed economy the commodity 
prices too) adjusts so quickly that  transactions different from those in general 
equilibrium, i.e., transactions generated by other wage rates than those in gen- 
eral equilibrium, can be neglected. We replace this assumption now by the pos- 
tulate that there are wage rigidities of one sort or another in a given period of 
time. Though we call this the short-run period we assume that  the transactions 
taking place during the period cannot be neglected. It should be noted that  the  
postulate of fixed wages is a simplified version of a more realistic model in 
which wages change at  every point in time but are nevertheless so sluggish that 
considerable amounts of all goods are exchanged before a general equilibrium 
is reached. 
We shall demonstrate that, in spite of sluggish wage adjustment, an equili- 
brium may exist, i.e., such a constellation of the remaining endogenous vari- 
ables that  the plans of the agents are consistent and therefore can be carried 
out. But as wage rates can be "wrong" in the sense of differing from those in a 
general competitive equilibrium, the equilibrium will be removed by induced 
changes of wage rates, which -- in the terminology of temporary equilibrium 
theory - are the 'slow' variables in our model: rationing on the labor market 
will lead to changes in the absolute levels of real and nominal wages, and a dif- 
ferential between sectoral wage rates will induce labor movements between sec- 
tors, which will in turn tend to equalize the wage rate across sectors. Thus the 
equilibrium is only a temporary one. In the present paper, however, only the 
temporary equilibrium, not the convergence of the economy towards a new gen- 
eral competitive equilibrium, will be analyzed; the convergence may be thought 
of as a sequence of temporary equilibria, each of which is valid for another 
given wage rate or wage differential. 
Given the  effects on real wage rates of opening the economy for trade 
described in Section 3, we can predict which kinds of "wage problems" will 
prevent the  economy from reaching the free-trade general equilibrium: 
downward or complete rigidity (either general or in the second sector) 
of the  real wage rate in terms of the second commodity, i.e., t ha t  com- 
modity whose production in general equilibrium would increase and 
which is exported; 
complete rigidity of the real wage ra te  in te rms of the  first commo- 
di ty; 
a differential between nominal sectoral wage rates and thus, given any 
price ratio p l / p 2 ,  between real sectoral wage rates in terms of any of 
the commodities. 
5. DOWNWARD RIGIDITY OF THE REAL WAGE RATE 
5.1. Downward Rigidity in Terms of the Export-Competing Commodity 
The analysis of the following Subsection 5.l.l(below)is based to some extent 
on the following contributions, which differ, however. in one way or another 
from our basic assumptions: Magee (1973. pp. 4-6) treats the one-factor, fixed- 
input coefficient case. Johnson (1965, pp. 14-10) and Chacholiades (1978, pp. 
522-524) discuss the two-factor case for a small economy, while Brecher (1974) 
does the  same for the large country. Schweinberger (1978) analyzes the  n- 
factor, n-commodity case for a small country. 
The analysis presented in Subsection 5.1.2 partly draws on the  work of 
Johnson (1969. pp. 600-603), who analyzes the consequences of sectoral down- 
ward rigidities of the  real wage ra te  for a two-factor, closed economy. 
None of these authors, however, uses our graphical exposition. 
5.1.1. Csneral Rigidity 
We analyze this case with the  help of Figure 3 where the minimum real 
wage rate in terms of X2 is drawn as a horizontal line in part I, indicating tha t  
the  free-trade level must not fall below the  pre-trade level. Throughout the fig- 
ure, the pre-trade (free-trade) general competitive positiorls are indicated by 
solid points (circles), whereas the temporary equilibrium positions for general 
wage rigidity are marked by rectangles. 
With the  real wage ra te  in terms of X2 rigid downward, Lz and Xz will not be 
raised above its pre-trade level. Moreover, part  VII shows that  because of the  
general validity of the  minimum wage, we now have the real wage rate in terms 
of Xl exceeding tha t  in the free-trade, general competitive equilibrium case 
(see the point marked as a rectangle). Therefore L1  and Xl are reduced even 
more than in tha t  case; in our graphical example they are set as zero, as can be 
seen in part VI. The effects on the sectoral production quantities are  indicated 
by the position of rectangle C in part 111. Comparing C with free-trade position B 
shows tha t  the structural  change in favor of the export-competing commodity 
Xz is stronger than in the  flexible-wage case. 
Part VII shows tha t  any ratio p  l / p 2  smaller than the international terms of 
trade implies an  even higher minimum wage in terms of X I .  Thus for all ratios 
smaller thak tha t  in B the domestic production quantities are always given by C 
in part 111. For ratios exceeding that  in B, but smaller than the pre-trade ratio 
in A, production takes place on a corresponding point on the horizontal line 
connecting C and k For ratios equal to  or greater  than that  in A, the  minimum 
wage is no  longer binding, and the free-trade production point lies on the seg- 
ment of the production possibility curve below point k Thus the transforma- 
tion curve is now given by this segment and the horizontal line connecting C 
and k This is reproduced in Figure 4. This transformation curve might be 
called a 'market transformation curve' because its particular form is generated 
by factor market distortions. The usual production possibility curve is called a 
'technical transformation curve' in this terminology; see Magee (1973, p. 16). It 
should be clear, however, that both are  the outcome of market processes which 
in the case of the  'technical' curve are those of a perfectly competitive econ- 
omy! Note that  lowering the minimum real wage in terms of Xz implies an 
upward shift of the  horizontal part. 
With L2 constant and L1  reduced in comparison to the previous situations, 
there is unemployment in the economy. The precise level for our graphical 
example is drawn as  a parallel to  the Lz-axis in part V of Figure 3. The less the  
terms of t rade p 2 / p  exceed the pre-trade price ratio, the lower is the level of 
FIGURE 3. 
FIGURE 4. 
unemployment. 
Given the employment effects, labor income is reduced in terms of Xz in 
comparison to both previous situations. In terms of XI, it is clearly reduced 
compared to the free-trade, flexible-wage case; it can be raised or reduced in 
comparison to the pre-trade labor income as p2/pl has been increased. 
With no production, profits are of course zero in the first sector and are 
thus lower in terms of any commodity than in both cases treated before. Given 
the minimum real wage rate, this result holds for any level of the terms of 
trade below the pre-trade price ratio and is thus not confined to our special 
example of zero production in the first sector (see the explanations of how to 
find out graphically the profit income of a sector given in Section 3). Profits in 
the exporting sector remain constant in terms of Xz but rise in terms of the 
import-competi.ng commodity. However, the rise is smaller than in the 
flexible-wage case; thus profits in the exporting sector are  smaller -- in terms 
of any commodity -- than in the flexible-wage case. Again these results hold for 
any price ratio exceeding that  in the pre-trade situation. In summary, the 
overall sum of profits is reduced in terms of both commodities in comparison to 
the free-trade, general competitive~equilibrium; in comparison to  the pre-trade - 
equilibrium, it  is reduced in terms of X2 whereas no general conclusion is possi- 
ble in terms of XI. 
Summarizing profit and labor income effects, the national income effect is 
graphically indicated in terms of X1(X2) by the  horizontal (vertical) intercept of 
the budget line through points C and C' in part 111 of Figure 3 and in Figure 4. It 
is reduced in terms of X2 in comparison to both previous situations for any 
international price ratio smaller than the pre-trade ratio. In terms of XI. the 
same is  t rue  in comparison to the free-trade, flexible wage case; however no 
general conclusion is possible in comparison to the pre-trade case, as for the 
international price ratio exceeding that  in our  graphical example, the produc- 
tion point C is horizontally shifted (see C" in Figure 4) so tha t  the  budget line 
might intersect the XI-axis to  the right of the  pre-trade budget line. 
In Figure 4, the  solid line drawn from the origin to B' (A) represents effec- 
tive household behavior in the commodity markets in view of alternative ration- 
ing levels on the  labor market and thus for alternative income levels, given the 
price ratio associated with B' (A). For our graphical example, the negative 
effects on employment and income lead to  reductions of demand for both com- 
modities (spill-over effects) in comparison to both previous cases, as can be 
seen from the  position of C'. Thus we clearly have a lower welfare level. Raising 
pl/p2 gradually back to the pre-trade level, the line indicating effective 
behavior OC'B' is gradually "shortened and shifted towards the line m; the 
point of effective commodity demand C' moves towards k Thus the results con- 
cerning commodity demand and welfare just mentioned hold for all price ratios 
smaller than the  pre-trade ratio. 
The preceding analysis can be summarized by the  following statement. In 
comparison t o  the  free-trade, general competitive equilibrium analysis, the  
opening of a small country for trade when the  real wage rate in terms of the 
export-competing commodity must not fall below the pre-trade level, leads to: 
a stronger reduction in the output of the import-competing commo- 
dity. Production of the export-competing commodity remains 
unchanged, meaning that no specialization takes place; 
a stronger shift of the production structure in favor of the exportable 
commodity; 
a reduction of the employment level, which is directly connected to 
the decline of production of the import-competing commodity; 
a smaller labor income (in terms of any of the commodities); 
smaller profit incomes (in terms of any of the commodities) in both 
sectors; 
smaller demand quantities for both goods because of the income 
effects, which are in turn due to the employment reduction. In the 
terminology of the theory of temporary equilibrium with quantity 
rationing, the effects of the reduced employment level on the demand 
for commodities are called spill-over effects; 
a lower welfare level. 
5.1.2. S c t o r a l  Rigidity 
In the case where the minimum real wage constraint is only valid for the  
second sector, employment L1 and output XI are not determined: with L2 
remaining at  its pre-trade level, L1 can take any level between zero and the 
difference between total labor endowment ES and Lz. The precise figure for L 1  
will depend on the  real wage rate the first sector has to pay. Corresponding to  
the two polar amounts for L1, there are two polar values for this real wage: 
(1) Production a t  the  maximum level X1 = f loS - L2) takes place if the 
real wage rate in the first sector in terms of XI is prevented from rising. With 
real wage rates in both sectors constant in terms of the respective outputs, the 
change in the commodity price ratio in favor of X2 implies a higher real wage 
rate in terms of any commodity in the second sector; this can be seen with the 
help of the free-trade price line in part VII of Figure 3. I t  should be clear that,  
for any absolute price level, this implies a t  the sarne time a differential 
between nominal sec:toral wages. Apparently this case is connected with 
completely different wage-setting behavior in both sectors: while i t  is orien- 
tated toward a given real wage rate in the second sector (possibly for reasons of 
maintaining purchasing power or the income shares of workers), it aims a t  pro- 
viding full employment and/or high levels of output in the  first. Thus, real 
wages in the first sector "suffer" from high claims in the second. 
I t  should be noted that ,  with the real wage rate in the  second sector per- 
fectly flexible in the upward direction, no excess demand situation in the labor 
market can arise before the  total labor supply has been taken over by the first 
sector. However, as production of the  pre-trade quantities XI and X2 already 
requires a wage differential, we neglect all combinations of Xl and X2 that  are 
located to the right of point A on the transformation curve (for these require an 
even greater differential in favor of the wage rate in the second sector). 
Figure 5 shows that opening the economy for trade leads only to one part 
of the possible welfare gain, i.e., the  consumption gain (movement from- A to Z). 
With both production quantities at their pre-trade levels, no specialization can 
take place; therefore the  specialization or production gain (movement from Z 
to  B') cannot be realized. For production and consumption gains see Johnson 
(1965, p. 14). 
Profits in the  first (second) sector in terms of XI remain constant (are 
raised), while they are reduced (remain constant) in terms of X2. Total labor 
income in terms of X1(X2) is raised (reduced). 
(2) Zero production in the  first sector requires that ,  after opening the 
economy for trade, the real wage in terms of Xl is raised a t  least up to the 
amount of the marginal product a t  L1 = 0. This might be justified by the hope 
of the first sector's labor force of obtaining a satisfactory part of the potential 
rise in national income. Given the independence of the sectoral wage claims 
underlying the present subsection, the  real wage claim in the  first sector will 
generally differ from that  in the second sector. 
The implications for production structure, employment level, profits, 
demand, and welfare are qualitatively the  same as in Subsection 5.1. 
FIGURE 5. 
5.2. More Downward Rigidities 
As was shown in Section 3, the free-trade general-competitive equilibrium 
requires a rise in the real wage rate in terms of the irnport-competing commo- 
dity. Thus a downward rigidity in  terms of XI does not impose any binding con- 
straint on the economy. 
Now suppose that  the minimum real wage rate is given in terms of a con- 
stant  utility combination of both commodities (see Figure 6). Graphically this 
means that  the household wants to achieve at least the utility level represented 
by the indifference curve through point A. Given the international terms of 
trade, i t  therefore has to realize a t  least an income allowing for point S. By the 
following reasoning i t  can be shown that the implied wage restriction does not 
become binding: the  position of the  tangent to the indifference curve is deter- 
mined by the  "target income" of the household, i.e.. by the income necessary to 
allow for the target utility level. On the other hand, the position of the tangent 
to the transformation curve is determined by the income implied by production 
point B. Assuming that the  household correctly anticipates the profit income 
implied by point B, the positions of both tangents can only differ because of dif- 
ferent labor incomes. Finally, with the full employment labor quantity underly- 
ing not only point B, but also point S (i.e., underlying not only the potential- 
production point, but also the minimum comsumption quantities), the tangent 
to the indifference curve must be connected with lower real wage rates in 
terms of both commodities than the tangent to the transformation curve. 
FIGURE 6. 
I t  should be noted that  our result -- namely, that  the above wage restric- 
tion is not binding -- does not really require tha t  the household expects full 
employment nor that  i t  expects the sum of profits implied by point B. If i t  
expects one or both of them to be smaller, it will raise its wage claims in order 
to preserve the income necessary for the consumption quantities of point S. As 
long as its expectations concerning profit income and employment do not 
underestimate by "too much" the profits and employment implied by produc- 
tion in point B, i ts wage claims will not be "too high", i.e., they will not prevent 
firms from producing in B and thus from realizing full employment. 
6. C0- RIGIDITY OF THE REAL WAGE RATE IN TERMS OF THE EXPORT- 
COMPETING COMMODITY 
The step from downward to complete rigidity of wages can be interpreted as 
a step from the  traditional treatment of factor price rigidity towards the so- 
called disequilibrium (or neokeynesian, fixed-price) theory. A pioneering con- 
tribution to this theory is that of Barro and Grossman (1971); the approach was 
introduced into the  monetary macroeconomics of open economies by Dixit 
(1978), followed by Neary (1980). It is a rather short-run approach and views 
prices as sluggish in either direction; moreoever. as a simplification and in 
order to make the implications of sluggishness clearer, total price rigidity is 
assumed. 
In the case of general complete rigidity, the resulting temporary equili- 
brium after the opening for trade is the same as in the case of downward rigi- 
dity: in the same way in which that equilibrium was connected in both sectors 
with the pre-trade levels of real wages in terms of ,&, i t  also constitutes the  
system's equilibrium position for the present case. 
By a similar line of reasoning i t  can be shown that complete rigidity in only 
the second sector leads to the same problems and to the same range of possible 
temporary equilibria as in the case of downward rigidity. 
7. CO- RIGIDITY OF THE REAL WAGE RATE IN TEXMS OF THE W O R T -  
COMPETING COMMODITY 
We analyze this case with the help of Figure 7, where the rigid wage in 
terms of Xl is drawn as  a vertical line in part VI. 
7.1. General  Rigidity 
With the real wage rate in terms of X1 rigid a t  the pre-trade level, the labor 
demand of the first sector is constant. On the other hand, the second sector's 
demand is raised: as can be seen from part VII. the  wage rigidity, together with 
the trade-induced decrease in the  commodity price ratio p l / p 2  implies a lower 
real wage rate for the second sector and thus an incentive to raise output and 
employment. In sum, we have then excess demand in the  labor market, marked 
by the vertical parallel to the L1-axis in part V. 
FIGURE 7.  
In this situation we cannot derive a temporary equilibrium position 
without introducing an explicit rationing scheme telling us how to divide total 
labor supply between the  production sectors; on the relevance of rationing 
schemes for temporary equilibrium analysis see Meyer (1983, pp. 92-96, 111- 
115). The following rationing schemes could be considered in the present case: 
(a) treatment of one sector as a priority purchaser, whose demand must 
be fully satisfied before the other sector gets any labor; 
(b) maintenance of the pre-trade sectoral employment levels; 
(c) uniform rationing, i-e., each sector gets the  same amount of labor; 
(d) proportional rationing, i.e., each sector gets the same percentage of 
its labor demand, with the percentage rates summing to one; 
(e) optimal ("rational") rationing, i.e., both sectors are provided with the  
amounts of labor that  lead to the maximum level of welfare for the  
present case. 
In the following discussion, we will only consider schemes (a) and (e). 
Treating the  first sector as a priority purchaser implies that L1 and Xl are 
kept at  their pre-trade levels. The remaining labor supply goes to  the second 
sector. meaning of course that L2 and X2 are also kept at  the original levels. As 
was discussed in Subsection 5.1.2, maintenance of the pre-trade production 
point A in part 111 means no specialization and structural change and thus 
allows only for the consumption, but not for the production gain. In contrast to 
Subsection 5.1.2, profits in the second sector are now raised in terms of X2 
because of the decline of the real wage rate in terms of X2 (note that  the ration- 
ing of the second sector implies that the marginal product of labor exceeds the  
real wage rate in that  sector). Of course, they are  raised even more in terms of 
XI. Total labor income in terms of X1(X2) is now kept constant (reduced). 
Treating the  second sector as a priority purchaser implies that L2 and X2 
are chosen according to point Q in part 11, leading to point Q' in part 111. Thus, 
the second sector expands even more than in the flexible-wage case, leading to  
over-specialization. Given the change of pl/p2, a welfare loss in comparison to 
the pre-trade situation becomes more likely, the nearer point Q' is situated to 
the given point R (i.e.. the less the marginal product of labor in the second sec- 
tor is declining in that part of the production function that corresponds to the  
segment AR of the transformation curve). The same statement applies if we 
compare the welfare effect with that of the preceding rationing scheme. Profits 
in the  first sector are reduced in terms of Xl because a t  the unchanged value of 
the real wage rate the first sector can only produce a t  point Q" rather than a t  
the profit-maximizing pre-trade level in part IV (because of the rationing, the  
marginal product in the first sector exceeds the real wage rate). Of course pro- 
fits go down even more in terms of X2. Profits in the second sector go up in 
terms of both goods even more than in the flexible-wage case. Labor income is 
reduced in terms of both commodities in the first sector. It is raised in terms 
of X1 in the second sector, while no precise statement can be made in terms of 
X2. Thus, there are no clear-cut effects on aggregate labor income in terms of 
any commodity. 
From part Ill of Figure 7 it  can be seen that the welfare maximum can be 
achieved by a rationing scheme that  provides each sector with the free-trade, 
flexible-wage amounts of labor (see point B and the corresponding points drawn 
as circles in the other parts of Figure 6). We might call this an "optimal" or 
"rational" scheme. In contrast to the cases just discussed, this implies ration- 
ing of both production sectors. However, there might be some resistance from 
different groups of people against this distribution of the country's labor 
endowment: 
in comparison to  the case where the first sector is treated as a prior- 
ity purchaser, profit and labor income in this sector are now lower in 
terms of any commodity; 
an analogous statement can be made for the  second sector in com- 
parison to the case where ii is treated as a priority purchaser; 
in comparison to  the pre-trade distribution, profit and labor income 
are reduced (raised) in terms of both commodities in the first 
(second) sector. 
I t  can be concluded that  there are substantial reasons for resistance to the 
optimal rationing scheme. Clearly, however, it can be shown by a similar line of 
reasoning that  treating any of the sectors as priority purchaser always makes 
the other worse off in some sense in comparison to the pre-trade distribution. 
Thus, any priority classification will likewise be rejected by one sector. (Note 
tha t  basing resistance to  (or preference for) a specific rationing scheme on its 
consequences for sectoral labor incomes implies tha t  there are a t  least two 
workers in the economy, one in each sector. This evidently contradicts our 
assumption of a single -- representative -- household. However, as  this is a 
highly simplifying assumption, the discussion above of potential resistance to  
various rationing schemes is not entirely without interest.) 
Furthermore, the above rationing schemes are all ra ther  ad hoc. However, 
any rationing scheme will be made redundant in a longer than short-run period 
because wages will tend to  rise and thus remove the excess demand for labor. 
7.2. Sectoral Rigidity 
As in the  preceding subsection the profit-maximizing and thus-the max- 
imum level of XI is identical to the pre-trade level. However, with no restric- 
tions on the real wage rate in the second sector, X2 cannot be determined 
without further assumptions (it should be clear that  in Figure 7 the dashed line 
drawn from part VII to  part  I and then downward, is no longer valid). Its range 
of possible levels is  now bounded by zero and the  complete-specialization quan- 
tity. Then the 'market transformation curve' is given by the  segment between 
points R and A on the  'technical transformation curve' and the vertical line 
between points A and P. It is  reproduced in Figure 8. 
Assuming tha t  even in the  more short-run period underlying our analysis, 
labor supply reacts to  sectoral wage differentials, the  precise production point 
of the  economy will entirely depend on the wage-setting behavior in the  second 
sector: 
production to  the left of point Q' can realistically be excluded because 
i t  requires a lower real wage rate (in terms of any commodity) in the  
second sector than in the  first and a t  the same t ime implies rationing 
of the  first sector. Thus, workers would move over into the  first sec- 
tor, removing its excess demand and reducing the  second sector's 
employment and production levels until the real wage rate is raised a t  
least to the level prevailing in the first sector; 
FIGURE 0. 
production between points Q' and A is still connected with rationing of 
t he  First sector, except for point A itself. Furthermore, i t  requires a 
higher rea l  wage rate  in the  second sector t han  in the  first; 
production will take place between points A and P if t he  real  wage 
claims in  t h e  second sector  a re  higher than  before t rade (see case (2) 
in Subsection 5.1.2 on this wage-setting behavior). All these points 
imply profit-maximizing outputs in  both sectors, and all points except 
A imply unemployment, which becomes higher the  more closely point 
P is approached. 
In view of these  reflections, only points on the  segment  Q'AP seem possible. 
The welfare effects of production between points Q' and A have been discussed 
in the  preceding subsection. It is immediately clear t ha t  points on the  segment  
AP imply less welfare than  those between B and A 
8. SECTORAL DIFFERENTlAL BETIREEN WAGE RATES 
The procedure of the preceding sections, where the wage restrictions only 
become binding after the opening for trade, is sometimes interpreted as the  
simultaneous introduction of trade and wage rigidities. Therefore it is criti- 
cized on the basis that  the  welfare effects due to  the opening for trade cannot 
be clearly separated from those of the introduction of the rigidity; see Magee 
(1973, pp. 5-6) and the references cited therein. In this section it is  assumed, 
on the  contrary, tha t  a differential between sectoral nominal wage rates has 
existed before trade is opened. This implies of course a corresponding differen- 
tial between real wage rates (in terms of any commodity) for any given commo- 
dity price ratio. We assume here that  this differential is given exogenously, in 
contrast to Subsections 5.1.2 and 7.2 where i t  was a (possible) result of confin- 
ing real wage rigidity to one sector. 
We assume the differential to be given in the following form, where wi 
denotes the nominal wage ra te  to be paid by sector i: 
As this differential exists before the opening for trade, we have an initial 
equilibrium different from that  of the preceding sections, where it was given by 
point A in Figure 6. However, for the price ratio prevailing in A, t he  marginal 
rate of transformation d X z / d X l  (i.e., the slope of the transformation curve in 
the production point) must now be smaller than in point A, as can be seen from 
the following equations: 
In Figure 9 we assume point Z to exhibit this slope, so that  this would be 
the production point a t  the pre-trade commodity price ratio of the preceding 
sections. Then, however, demand would be given by point T. so that we would 
have excess demand for (supply of) X1(X2). Thus the pre-trade equilibrium is 
now characterized by a higher ratio pl/p2, for example by that indicated by 
the price line through point A'. In A' the marginal rate of substitution of both 
commodities in consumption is identical t o  the equilibrium price ratio, 
whereas the marginal rate of transformation in production is smaller. There- 
fore the indifference curve is not tangent to the transformation curve; because 
of this the factor 1/ t in equation (9.2) is called the non-tangency factor; see 
Magee (1973, pp. 16-17). 
FIGURE 9. 
We will analyze the effects of opening for trade with the help of Figure 10. 
which incorporates explicitly the nominal wage rates zul,ur2 paid by the sectors 
in part VII. The slope of the  price lines in that  part is equal to  1/ t .  Part VIII 
shows the value marginal product of labor in the second sector. Using Xl as a 
numerilire = 1). the corresponding schedule for the first sector is identical 
to the schedule of t h e  marginal product in terms of XI. as drawn in part VI. 
dl, 
L2 
FIGURE 10. 
The pre-trade equilibrium is indicated by point A' in part 111. The 
corresponding positions in the  other parts of Figure 9 are marked as  solid 
points. 
The subsequent analysis of trade effects draws to some extent on t h e  fol- 
lowing work: Hagen (1958, pp. 504-506) treats the  one-factor. fixed-input coeffi- 
cient case; Magee (1973, pp. 11-13) reviews Hagen's article and gives an  alge- 
braic formulation. Johnson (1965, pp. 23-26), Chacholiades (1978, pp. 513-518), 
and Woodland (1982, pp. 499-503) discuss models with more than one factor of 
production. , 
As in the preceding sections we now assume that the domestic price ratio 
p l / p 2  is smaller than the ratio on the  world market, the latter (former) being 
indicated by the slope of the price line through point D' (A'). Moreover the 
international te rms of trade are assumed to exceed the marginal ra te  of 
transformation in the  pre-trade production point A'. Without any wage differen- 
tial, production after trade would take place in point D. In view of the differen- 
tial, the new equilibrium value for wl(w2) must be higher (lower) than the  
value corresponding to D. Given the same terms of trade as in point D, this 
implies a higher (lower) real wage in the first (second) sector. Thus the  new 
equilibrium point D' is characterized not just by an increased production of the 
commodity whose relative price was increased, but even by overspecialization 
in the  sense that  the  marginal rate of transformation dX2/dX1 in the new pro- 
duction point is smaller than the international price ratio. A welfare gain may 
or may not be achieved (it should be noted that  in a Ricardo-type model, i.e.. 
for a model with Fixed input coefficients, we will unambiguously have a welfare 
gain in this case). 
Next let us suppose that  the  international terms of trade pl/p2 are 
smaller than the domestic ratio but greater than the marginal rate of transfor- 
mation before trade. In part 111 of Figure 8 the ratio on the world market  is 
indicated by the slope of the dashed price line. The point of tangency with the 
transformation curve would indicate the  production point in the case of no dif- 
ferential. Since the  differential exists, however, the production point lies to the 
left of A' as long as  the foreign ratio does not exceed the domestic one; this 
result is also derived by Magee (1973, pp. 12-13) for the case of fixed input coef- 
ficients. In the  present case the  domestic country chooses a production point 
between points D and A'. 
For a fixed-input coefficient model, Hagen (1958, pp. 504-505) shows that  
welfare is reduced in this case, implying that  protection is superior to free 
trade. In our model, however, the fact that the world market ratio is smaller 
than the domestic ratio does not imply complete specialization in X2 and thus 
does not lead to the sharp welfare reduction of Hagen's model. Therefore no 
clear-cut statement concerning the  welfare change is possible in the present 
case. 
Nevertheless our model resembles that of Hagen to a certain extent: 
because of the wage differential the domestic country does not specialize in XI. 
as would be implied by the comparison of the international terms of trade 
p l / p 2  with the marginal rate of transformation at  the pre-trade production 
point A'. In this sense we may speak of an inverse specialization or a reversal of 
the patterns of trade. Because of this inverse specialization the country does 
not necessarily realize a welfare gain as would be the case in the absence of a 
differential. 
Finally, suppose that  the international terms of trade exceed the domestic 
ratio and are thus significantly greater than the  marginal rate of transforma- 
tion before trade. This implies specialization in XI, i.e., in the right direction. 
However, the production point still lies to the left of the tangency point of the 
international price line and the transformation curve, implying again that the 
welfare maximizing production point is not realized. Nevertheless we can say 
with certainty that there is now a welfare gain. 
It should be clear that the foregoing analysis can be carried out analo- 
gously when there is a differential in favor of the second sector's employees. In 
that case the national production point lies to the right of the tangency point of 
the price line and the transformation curve. 
9. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
Using graphical expositions developed in Sections 2 and 3, Sections 5-8 of 
the present paper have analyzed the short-run effects of opening a small econ- 
omy. The term 'short-run' was intended to denote a time horizon within which 
wage rates have not yet reached their (free-trade) general competitive 
equilibrium values (see Section 4 on this point). Therefore we do not interpret 
our discussion as contradictory to but rather as a complement to the long-run 
general competitive analysis. Depending on the adjustment process initiated 
by wage differentials or labor market imbalances, the results of the latter type 
of analysis may hold in the long run. 
In Subsection 5.1.1 it was shown that general downward rigidity of the real 
wage rate in terms of the export-competing commodity prevents the home 
country from specialization and leads to unemployment and to production 
below the production possibility curve. Moreover, the production structure is 
raised in favor of the export-competing sector more than in the flexible wage 
case, while the level of welfare is reduced in comparison to the pre-trade situa- 
tion. 
Confining the rigidity to the export-competing sector, the temporary 
equilibrium position is not unique but depends on wage setting behavior in the 
importables sector (see Subsection 5.1.2). If this is orientated toward full 
employment, the pre-trade production quantities are preserved, meaning that 
only part of the possible welfare gain is realized. If instead it is aimed at a large 
part of the potential rise of national income, it will lead to unemployment and, 
probably, to  a welfare loss. 
In Section 6 it was argued that these results also hold in the case where 
the real wage in terms of the export-competing commodity is completely rigid. 
Subsection 7.1 showed that a general complete rigidity of the real wage 
rate in terms of the import-competing commodity leads to excess demand in 
the labor market. Depending on the rationing scheme, the introduction of 
trade may have various effects on the sectoral production levels and thus on 
welfare. Treating the import-competing sector as a priority purchaser implies 
that the pre-trade production quantities are preserved and that only part of the 
possible welfare gain is realized. Treating the expor-t-competing sector as a 
priority purchaser implies over-specialization in that sector's output; welfare 
may be increased or reduced. depending on the degree of the change in the 
terms of trade and on the production function of the second sector. We point 
out that there is an "optimal". i.e., welfare-maximizing rationing scheme 
characterized by the sectoral unemployment levels that would prevail in the 
flexible-wage case. 
Confining the rigidity to  the import-competing sector, temporary equili- 
bria with excess demand as well as equilibria with excess supply in the labor 
market become possible, the latter probably implying lower welfare levels than 
the former. As in Subsection 5.1.2, the precise production quantities and thus 
the welfare level depend on wage-setting behavior in the sector in which there 
is no wage rigidity. 
In Section 8, the labor market distortion (which is now a wage differential 
between sectors) already exists before trade. Depending on the difference 
between the domestic and the international price ratio, over-specialization or 
inverse specialization may occur (defined in a way appropriate for a country 
characterized by a wage differential). Only if the price ratio changes in favor of 
the sector paying the differential do we clearly have a welfare gain. 
From the above results it can be concluded that,  in view of non- 
instantaneous wage adjustment, the effects of trade will most probably differ 
from those of the traditional general competitive equilibrium. In the literature 
on optimal trade intervention in the two-factor model. however, it is shown for 
cases of general downward rigidity of the real wage rate and for factor price dif- 
ferentials that this does not imply that protection is the best policy measure 
but rather that policy intervention must take place at the exact point where 
the distortion occurs; see, e.g., Johnson (1965, pp. 5, 23-26), and Chacholiades 
(1978, pp. 501, 515-516, 524). Extending the scope of the present paper, this 
general rule for optimal trade intervention should be checked for our one- 
factor model. Furthermore, the  time horizon of our model should be extended 
in order to illustrate the medium-run adjustment and the long-run response to 
the opening for trade. Several other extensions of our analysis seem possible, 
e.g., dropping the small-country assumption, disaggregating the household sec- 
tor, etc. Most important, however, seem steps towards the integration of the 
long-run, pure theory of international trade and the more short-run, monetary 
macroeconomics of open economies; assuming sectoral capital inputs to be 
fixed and departing from the assumption of instantaneous adjustment of prices, 
the present paper can be viewed as an attempt to bring the former approach 
closer to the latter (at least if by the latter we mean Keynesian open-economy 
macroeconomics). 
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